The principle of the relativity of the personal nature of punishment in the application of the penalty of publishing the judgment lies in the policy of imposing the prescribed penalty as one form of criminal sanction on the perpetrator of the crime, by the lofty principle of no crime and no punishment except as provided by law, as stipulated in Article (26) of the legislative pyramid in the Sultanate. This principle enhances the justice of criminal justice by establishing the rule that crime does not tolerate incitement in trial. However, modern penal laws have introduced many penalties that imply another dimension to the punishment under the guise of complementary and subsidiary penalties, in addition to the original penalties of death, imprisonment, and fines provided for in Article (53) of the Omani Penal Code.

Complementary penalties are defined as those “decided by the criminal judge as an inevitable consequence of the judgment of the original penalty,” meaning that their enforcement is carried out by the force of law once the judgment of the original penalty for the crime is passed, even if the judge does not pronounce them as long as the legislator has approved them. The convicted person has no right to object to their enforcement due to the failure to pronounce them, and there is no impediment to their implementation by the public prosecutor as the guardian of public prosecution, responsible for enforcing the issued judgments. As for the complementary penalty, it is “a penalty whose imposition is subject to the pronouncement of the judge after the law permits him to do so.”

In the context of our discussion, we will address the penalty of “publishing the judgment” as mentioned in paragraph (y) of Article (57) of the Omani Penal Code, considering it one of the complementary and subsidiary penalties according to the context.

The ancillary penalties are defined as those which the criminal judge decides as an inevitable consequence of the judgment of the original penalty, meaning that their enforcement is mandated by law once the judge has ruled on the original penalty prescribed for the crime, even if the judge did not explicitly pronounce them as long as they are established by the legislator. The convicted person has no right to object to their enforcement due to the judge’s failure to pronounce them, and there is no room for non-compliance in their implementation by the public prosecutor, as it is responsible for enforcing the judgments issued therein. As for the supplementary penalty, it is defined as: “the penalty whose imposition is contingent upon the judge’s pronouncement after the law permits him to do so.” In our discussion, we will address the penalty of “publishing judgments” as stipulated in paragraph (y) of Article 57 of the Omani Penal Code as one of the ancillary and supplementary penalties depending on the context.

Through examining the text of Article 56 of the Penal Code, it becomes evident that: “The penalty is considered ancillary if the law mandates it as an inevitable consequence of the judgment of the original penalty, and it is considered supplementary if its imposition depends on the judge’s pronouncement if the law permits him to impose it.” From this, it is understood that the penalty of publishing judgments, since the Omani legislator included it among the penalties listed in Article 57, can sometimes be ancillary, where the judge’s discretion in not considering it is restricted, and at other times, it can be supplementary, wherein its imposition is left to the discretionary authority of the judge.

The subsidiary nature of the punishment is stipulated in Article 90 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Law: “Legal persons proven responsible for money laundering or financing terrorism shall be punished with a fine not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand Omani Rials, and not exceeding the value of the funds involved in the crime. The court may also order a permanent or temporary ban on the legal person from conducting its commercial activities, closing down its premises used in committing the crime, liquidating its business, or appointing a judicial guardian to manage its funds. The final judgment of conviction shall be published in the media.” Additionally, Article 44 of the Consumer Protection Law complements this, stating: “In case of a conviction, the court may order the publication of a summary of the judgment in two widely circulated newspapers, one in Arabic, at the expense of the convicted individual.”

The controversy revolves around the realization of the principle of the personalization of punishment, especially when the court imposes the penalty of publication on the convicted individual, whether as a subsidiary or complementary punishment. Some crimes undermine public trust, such as those harming the state’s economy by tampering with its funds or those committed by traders against consumers. Advocates argue for the necessity of publishing details of the judgment issued against the accused to uphold the state’s right to punishment and prevent criminals from escaping justice. This serves as a public declaration against undermining public trust and ensures the specific deterrence for the accused by broadcasting their personal information to the public, reinforcing the inevitability of punishment.

The principle of the personalization of punishment is indirectly affected when the court imposes the penalty of publication, through the extension of the impact of applying the punishment to individuals other than the convicted. The intended element of shame, considered the essence of punishment and its noble message that distinguishes it from other penalties, becomes evident in the light of the application of this punishment to the convicted individual, their surroundings, and associated individuals. While not a legislative goal in itself, it is a collateral consequence imposed by the nature of the punishment and cannot be directly considered a departure from the principle of the personalization of punishment.

Therefore, achieving the balance between the state’s exercise of its right to punishment, burying the remnants of the crime in society, and considering the social dimension inherent in the punishment of publishing the judgment necessitates taking into account the empowerment granted by the legislator to the criminal judge through the authority to suspend the execution of the punishment against the accused under Article 71 of the Omani Penal Code, within the scope of the publication punishment. The suspension of execution in this case may apply to the publication penalty, whether subsidiary or complementary, citing the same article: “The court may make the suspension of execution comprehensive, including the penal consequences resulting from the judgment, or any subsidiary or complementary punishment except confiscation.” The legislator made the decision to suspend or not a discretionary power for the judge, guided by the circumstances and specifics of each crime and its perpetrator.

Achieving this balance may involve legislative intervention in addressing the scope of applying the penalty of publishing the judgment to prevent the harm that may befall the families of the convicted individuals, and ensuring deterrence through the determination of the suspension of execution of this penalty until the finalization of the judgment as an indicator of reality, not subject to final appeal. Publishing immediately upon the issuance of the judgment, in light of the judgment not being completely fortified, may lead to the psychological harm intended to be avoided for those not convicted.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Omani legislator has done well through the punitive provisions that ensure the achievement of the noble goals intended by the penalty of publishing the judgment and address the controversy surrounding the personalization of punishment for publishing the conviction. Thus, it is necessary to apply a form of balance between general and specific considerations in its implementation